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1 Introduction
This paper studies mechanisms or institutions for allocating resources. A mech-
anism is modeled as a game form, which specifies a set of admissible actions for
each agent and a feasible allocation for each profile of actions. This paper proves
a simple and general theorem on mechanisms whose Nash equilibrium allocations
are Pareto efficient.
We focus on allocation problems in which monetary transfers are feasible.
We say that a mechanism is normal if at any profile of actions, the mechanism
neither charges nor pays an agent who obtains his endowments. In the context
of auctions, this simply means that a loser neither pays nor receives a positive
amount. We show that for any normal mechanism, if its Nash equilibrium al-
locations are Pareto efficient for all profiles of preferences, then the equilibrium
allocations are necessarily in the core. In other words, if a sub-correspondence of
the Pareto correspondence can be implemented by a normal mechanism in Nash
equilibrium, then the implemented correspondence is a sub-correspondence of the
core correspondence. This implies that achieving Pareto efficient allocations is
equivalent to achieving core allocations provided that only normal mechanisms
are admissible and the equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium.
The result holds for a large class of allocation problems in which monetary
transfers are admissible and the consumption space is discrete except for the
space of transfers. Examples include auctions of an arbitrary number of objects,
economies with indivisible public goods, matching problems, and coalition for-
mation. Examples are given in Section 6.
For allocation problems in which the core is empty for some preference pro-
files, our result implies that there exists no normal mechanism whose Nash equi-
librium allocations are Pareto efficient for all preference profiles. Thus, to ensure
efficiency, the planner has to use a mechanism that sometimes charges or pays
agents who keep their endowments.
The next section illustrates the basic argument of the result by using exam-
ples in the context of auctions. The main section of the paper is Section 5, in
which we prove two theorems that produce the result stated above as a corollary.
The theorems divide normality into no-tax-for-endowments and no-subsidy-for-
endowments, and derive their implications separately. We will see that the driving
force of our main result is no-subsidy-for-endowments. The theorems are stated
in terms of Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999), which implies that the theorems
also apply to other notions of implementation for which Maskin monotonicity is
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a necessary condition. Our results are also relevant for allocation problems in
which monetary transfers are not feasible, which is discussed in Section 7. Ap-
pendix A proves parallel results for social choice functions that are strategy-proof
and non-bossy.
2 Examples
This section illustrates the basic argument of the main result by using examples
in the context of auctions. Suppose that there are three agents. One of them (the
seller) initially owns one indivisible object, and the other agents (buyers 1 and 2)
are interested in buying the object. Suppose that preferences are quasi-linear and
the buyers’ valuations for the object are (v1, v2) = (5, 3). The seller’s valuation
for the object is assumed to be zero, i.e., he is a revenue-maximizer.
A mechanism (game form) specifies an action set of each buyer and the out-
come for each profile of actions. A mechanism is called normal if at any action
profile, the mechanism neither charges nor pays a buyer who does not obtain the
object.1
The main result states that for any normal mechanism whose Nash equilib-
rium allocations are Pareto efficient for all profiles of valuations, the equilibrium
allocations are actually in the core.
This is not to say that the Pareto set and the core coincide; of course, the
core is a proper subset of the Pareto set for generic valuations. In our example
above, any allocation in which buyer 1 wins the object is Pareto efficient, while
the core requires that buyer 1 pay between 3 and 5. What our result says is that
a normal mechanism cannot implement a correspondence that always chooses
Pareto efficient allocations but sometimes chooses allocations outside of the core.
We use Nash equilibrium with complete information, which may strike some
readers as unreasonable given that the auction literature usually uses Bayesian
equilibrium. However, it should be noted that our result extends beyond the
simple auction problem and holds for a rather large class of allocation problems.
To see our result in the above example, take any normal mechanism whose
equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient for all profiles of valuations. We first
derive individual rationality. Suppose that for the above valuation profile, buyer 1
wins the object and pays 6 > 5 at some Nash equilibrium (m1,m2). Buyer 1’s
utility is negative in this equilibrium, while normality guarantees a zero utility
1An important auction mechanism that violates normality is the all-pay mechanism.
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for a loser. This implies that 1 cannot lose the auction by changing his action
as long as 2 chooses m2. For if 1 could lose, m1 would not be a best response to
m2. Thus, given m2, all 1 can do is to win the object and pay at least 6, and m1
achieves the minimum payments. This trivially implies that (m1,m2) is also a
Nash equilibrium when 1’s valuation is w1 = 2. However, this equilibrium is not
Pareto efficient, a contradiction.
We now show that equilibrium outcomes are in the core. Suppose then that
for valuation profile (v1, v2) = (5, 3), buyer 1 wins the object and pays 2.5 < 3 at
some Nash equilibrium (m1,m2). This implies that given m2, buyer 1 can win the
object only by paying at least 2.5, and he pays 0 if he loses. It trivially follows
that (m1,m2) is also a Nash equilibrium when 1’s valuation is w1 = 2.7, since he
is still willing to pay 2.5 for the object and he cannot lower the price given that
2 chooses m2. However, this equilibrium is not Pareto efficient, a contradiction.
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The result also holds when there exist more than one object. To see how the
argument extends to the multi-object case, suppose that there are two objects (a
and b) and buyers’ valuation functions are given by
{a, b} {a} {b} ∅
v1 9 2 6 0
v2 5 4 2 0
We continue to assume that the seller is a revenue-maximizer, i.e., his valuation
is zero for all bundles of objects. In this example, Pareto efficiency means that
buyer 1 obtains b and buyer 2 obtains a. Let pi denote buyer i’s payments. Then
it is easily checked that the core allocations are the Pareto efficient allocations in
which 1 ≤ p1 ≤ 6 and 3 ≤ p2 ≤ 4. For example, if p2 < 3, then the allocation is
blocked by buyer 1 and the seller; the seller would take a from buyer 2 and give
it to buyer 1 in exchange for 3 units of money.
Now, take any normal mechanism whose equilibrium outcomes are Pareto
efficient. To see why equilibrium outcomes must belong to the core, suppose that
p2 = 3−ε < 3 at some Nash equilibrium (m1,m2) for the above valuation profile.
Let P ({a, b}) denote the infimum amount that 2 must pay to obtain both objects
given that 1 chooses m1; if 2 cannot obtain both objects given that 1 chooses
2The argument breaks down if the mechanism is not normal since buyer 1 may then be able
to receive a positive amount if he loses. For example, suppose that he could receive 1 dollar if
he loses. This does not destroy the initial equilibrium since by winning the object, 1 obtains
a surplus of 5 − 2.5 > 1. However, (m1,m2) is no longer an equilibrium when 1’s valuation is
w1 = 2.7 since by winning the object, 1 only obtains a surplus of 2.7− 2.5 < 1.
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m1, then P ({a, b}) =∞. Define P (b) and P (∅) analogously. Note that since the
mechanism is normal, if P (∅) is finite (i.e., if 2 can lose), then P (∅) = 0. The
fact that m2 is a best response to m1 means that
v2(a)− (3− ε) ≥ max{v2({a, b})− P ({a, b}), v2(b)− P (b),−P (∅)}.
Now, an obvious but important observation is that since P (∅) is either infinite or
zero, the above inequality continues to hold if we decrease buyer 2’s valuation for
each non-empty bundle by the same number provided that it does not make the
left-hand side negative. In particular, we can decrease 2’s valuation for each non-
empty bundle by v2(a)− (3− ε) = 1 + ε without violating the inequality. Thus,
(m1,m2) remains a Nash equilibrium when the valuation functions are given by
{a, b} {a} {b} ∅
v1 9 2 6 0
w2 4− ε 3− ε 1− ε 0
However, the equilibrium is not Pareto efficient because for (v1, w2) both objects
should go to buyer 1 at any Pareto efficient allocation.
The result holds for more general allocation problems. The next section
presents a class of allocation problems for which the result holds.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Allocation Problems
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of agents (n ≥ 2). There exists a divisible
commodity, which is referred to as “money.” The consumption space of agent
i ∈ N is given by Xi × R where Xi is an arbitrary non-empty set. A generic
element of Xi ×R is denoted by ai = (xi, ti) where ti ∈ R denotes the amount of
money that i receives and xi ∈ Xi denotes the remaining part of the consumption
bundle.
3.1.1 Preferences
Each agent i ∈ N has a complete and transitive binary relation Ri defined over
Xi×R. As usual, aiRi a′i means that ai is at least as good as a′i for agent i. The
strict preference and indifference relations are denoted by Pi and Ii, respectively.
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The universal set of complete and transitive binary relations overXi×R is denoted
by RUi . Let Ri ⊆ RUi be a non-empty subset of admissible preferences for agent i.
We impose the following assumptions on Ri.
P1* (Strict Monotonicity in Money). For all i ∈ N , all Ri ∈ Ri, all
x ∈ Xi, and all t, t′ ∈ R, if t′ > t, then (x, t′) Pi (x, t).
P2* (Compensability). For all i ∈ N , all Ri ∈ Ri, all x, x′ ∈ Xi, and all
t ∈ R, there exists t′ ∈ R such that (x′, t′) Ii (x, t).
The second assumption says that a sufficient amount of money can make up for
any bundle of non-monetary goods. That is, no bundle of non-monetary goods is
“infinitely desirable” nor “infinitely undesirable.”
P1* and P2* are imposed throughout the paper (which is why we put aster-
isks). The following is not always imposed but important.
R1 (Richness for Agent i). Ri contains all quasi-linear preferences.3
This says that any quasi-linear preferences are admissible. This is a condition of
the richness of the set of admissible preferences. This condition is not necessarily
imposed for all agents. The set of agents for whom the richness condition is
satisfied is denoted by Nr ⊆ N . R1 can be weakened; see Remark 4 below.
When Xi is a “continuous” set (e.g., R`), R1 is not very reasonable because
it says that even discontinuous quasi-linear preferences are admissible. Similarly,
R1 may not be very interesting when Xi is ordered in a way that is economi-
cally meaningful since then conditions such as monotonicity and single-peakedness
would be relevant. The interesting case is therefore when Xi is discrete and there
exists no clear economic ordering on Xi, in which case R1 is not unreasonable.
Section 6 gives a few such examples of allocation problems.
To see why one may not want to assume R1 for all agents, recall that in
the examples in the previous section, we assumed that the seller is a revenue-
maximizer. The assumption, which is often imposed in the auction literature,
implies that |Ri| = 1 for the seller. Thus R1 is violated for him.
We let R = R1 ×R2 × · · · × Rn denote the set of preference profiles, whose
elements are denoted by R = (R1, R2, . . . , Rn). As usual, (R
′
i, R−i) denotes the
preference profile that is equivalent to R except that agent i’s preferences are R′i.
We define (R′S, RN\S) similarly.
3A preference relation Ri is quasi-linear if it can be represented by a utility function of the
form u(xi, ti) = v(xi) + ti for some function v : Xi → R.
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3.1.2 Feasible Allocations
We denote agent i’s initial consumption bundle by (ωi, 0), where ωi is a predeter-
mined element of Xi. In what follows, ωi is called i’s endowments , while (ωi, 0)
is called i’s initial consumption bundle .
There is an exogenously given non-empty set A ⊆∏i∈N(Xi ×R) of feasible
allocations. A generic feasible allocation is denoted by a, and as usual, ai
denotes agent i’s consumption bundle in allocation a.
Similarly, for each coalition S ⊆ N , there is an exogenously given set AS ⊆∏
i∈S(Xi × R) of allocations that S can achieve on its own. Elements aS ∈ AS
are referred to as feasible S-allocations . Feasible allocations are equivalent to
feasible N -allocations, i.e., A = AN . While we assume A 6= ∅, we allow AS = ∅
for S ( N .
We consider the following assumptions on A and AS.
F1. For all i ∈ N , there exists a ∈ A such that ai = (ωi, 0).
F2 (Transferability). For all (xi, ti)i∈N ∈ A and all vectors m ∈ RN , if∑
i∈N mi = 0, then (xi, ti +mi)i∈N ∈ A.
F3 (No Negative Externality). For all coalitions ∅ 6= S ( N and all
aS ∈ AS,
(aS, (ωi, 0)i∈N\S) ∈ A.
F1 says that for each agent, there exists at least one feasible allocation in
which he consumes his initial consumption bundle. This is trivially satisfied if
the “initial allocation” (ωi, 0)i∈N is feasible, which is the case for most of the
applications.
F2 simply says that it is feasible to transfer money among agents. While this
assumption is reasonable and standard, it is not completely innocuous because it
implies that there are no bounds to monetary transfers, which is a rather strong
assumption.
F3 says that if aS is a feasible allocation for S, then it is feasible that S con-
sumes aS and the other agents consume their initial consumption bundles. This
is satisfied for typical private-good economies (e.g., auctions, marriage problems,
house-allocation problems, etc). For example, in marriage problems, if a man
and a woman can match with each other, then the matching in which this pair
forms and the other agents remain single is feasible.
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F3 does not hold if a coalition can produce public “bads” that are necessarily
consumed by other agents. An example is a situation in which a coalition can emit
pollution that inevitably harms other agents; the other agents cannot consume
(wi, 0) because “clean air” is no longer available. On the other hand, F3 is not
necessarily violated when a coalition can produce public goods and other agents
can refuse to consume them. For example, libraries are usually non-rival and
refusable. A formal example is given in Section 6.3.
F1–F3 are not always imposed. Our results specify which of them are required.
3.2 Social Choice Correspondences and Implementation
This section introduces a few standard definitions on social choice correspon-
dences and implementation.4
A social choice correspondence is a correspondence ϕ : R ³ A that
associates with each admissible preference profile R ∈ R a subset of feasible
allocations ϕ(R) ⊆ A.5
A feasible allocation a ∈ A is Pareto efficient for R ∈ R if there exists no
feasible allocation a′ ∈ A such that a′i Ri ai for all i ∈ N with strict preference
holding for some i ∈ N . The set of Pareto efficient allocations for R is denoted
by P (R), and the correspondence P is called the Pareto correspondence .
A feasible allocation a ∈ A is improved upon by a coalition S ⊆ N under
R ∈ R if there exists a feasible S-allocation a′S ∈ AS such that a′i Ri ai for all
i ∈ S with strict preference holding for some i ∈ S. When this is the case, we
also say that a′S dominates a for S under R. The core for R is the set of
feasible allocations that cannot be improved upon by any coalition S ⊆ N under
R. Let C(R) denote the core for R. The correspondence C is called the core
correspondence , which is not necessarily nonempty-valued.
A feasible allocation a ∈ A is individually rational for R ∈ R if aiRi (ωi, 0)
for all i ∈ N . The set of individually rational allocations for R is denoted by I(R).
A sub-correspondence of a social choice correspondence ϕ is a social choice
correspondence ϕ′ such that ϕ′(R) ⊆ ϕ(R) for all R ∈ R. We denote this by
ϕ′ ⊆ ϕ.
A mechanism (or game form) is a list G = ((Mi)i∈N , g) where Mi is a
non-empty set of strategies for agent i and g :
∏
i∈N Mi → A assigns a feasible
4Excellent surveys of the implementation literature include Moore (1991), Corchon (1996),
Palfrey (2000), and Jackson (2001).
5The arrow ³ is used for a correspondence. That is, f : X ³ Y means that f associates
with each element of X a subset of Y .
8
allocation to each strategy profile.
We say that a social choice correspondence ϕ is (fully) implementable in
Nash equilibrium if there exists a game form G such that, for all R ∈ R, the
set of Nash equilibrium allocations of game (G,R) coincides with ϕ(R).
4 Axioms
This section introduces our main axioms. We first define them for allocations
and then extend the definitions to mechanisms.
Say that a feasible allocation satisfies no-tax-for-endowments if no agent who
consumes his endowments pays a positive amount. Similarly, a feasible alloca-
tion satisfies no-subsidy-for-endowments if no one who consumes his endowments
receives a positive amount. Finally, a feasible allocation satisfies no-transfer-for-
endowments or normality if no transfer is made neither to nor from an agent who
keeps his endowments. Although we used the term normality in the first two
sections, we use no-transfer-for-endowments in what follows.
Definition. A feasible allocation (xi, ti)i∈N satisfies
(i) no-tax-for-endowments if for all i ∈ N , if xi = ωi, then ti ≥ 0,
(ii) no-subsidy-for-endowments if for all i ∈ N , if xi = ωi, then ti ≤ 0,
(iii) no-transfer-for-endowments , or normality , if (i) and (ii) are both
satisfied.
Let Ant , Ans , and An denote the sets of feasible allocations that satisfy (i),
(ii), and (iii), respectively.
The above definitions refer to allocations. We also define corresponding ax-
ioms for mechanisms.
Definition. AmechanismG = ((Mi)i∈N , g) satisfies no-tax-for-endowments ,
no-subsidy-for-endowments , and no-transfer-for-endowments if for all
m ∈∏i∈N Mi, g(m) ∈ Ant , g(m) ∈ Ans , and g(m) ∈ An , respectively.
Notice that these definitions do not refer to equilibrium. For example, a mech-
anism satisfies no-tax-for-endowments if at any strategy profile, the mechanism
does not charge an agent who keeps his endowments.
It may appear that no-tax-for-endowments rules out entry fees. Under mecha-
nisms that charge entry fees (e.g., matching services), it is possible that an agent
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pays an entry fee and ends up consuming ωi (e.g., finding no job). However,
no-tax-for-endowments does not necessarily rule out entry fees if N is the set of
participants, who have already paid entry fees, and G = ((Mi)i∈N , g) describes
the post-entry stage of the mechanism. With this interpretation, what is ruled
out by no-tax-for-endowments is a situation in which an agent pays an entry fee,
keeps his endowments (xi = ωi), and then pays an amount in addition to the
entry fee, where the additional fee depends on other agents’ actions.
It might be helpful to compare our axioms with individual rationality. First,
our axioms refer to purely physical features of allocation or mechanism, while in-
dividual rationality involves information about preferences. Second, our axioms
apply only to agents who obtain their endowments and does not say anything
about the others, while individual rationality applies to all agents. Third, indi-
vidual rationality does imply no-tax-for-endowments, but the converse does not
hold. Finally, individual rationality has no direct logical relation with no-subsidy-
for-endowments (or no-transfer-for-endowments).
5 Results
Before we state and prove our results, we first introduce important definitions.
Given a consumption bundle ai ∈ Xi × R and a preference relation Ri ∈ Ri,
we define the lower-contour set of Ri at ai by
L(Ri, ai) = {a′i ∈ Xi × R : ai Ri a′i}.
Given a subset B ⊆ A of feasible allocations, we denote its projection on
agent i’s consumption space by Proj i(B). That is,
Proj i(B) = {ai ∈ Xi × R : (ai, a−i) ∈ B for some a−i}.
Definition. Given a subset B ⊆ A, a social choice correspondence ϕ is
Maskin monotonic with respect to B if for all R,R′ ∈ R and all a =
(ai)i∈N ∈ ϕ(R) ∩B, if for all i ∈ N ,
L(Ri, ai) ∩ Proj i(B) ⊆ L(R′i, ai) ∩ Proj i(B), (1)
then a ∈ ϕ(R′).
That is, Maskin monotonicity with respect to B means that if an allocation
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a ∈ B is ϕ-optimal for some R and another preference profile R′ is obtained by
expanding each agent’s lower-contour set within Proj i(B) at ai, then a remains
ϕ-optimal for R′.
When (1) holds, we say that R′i is a Maskin monotonic transformation
of Ri at ai with respect to Proj i(B). When (1) holds for all agents, then we say
that R′ is a Maskin monotonic transformation of R at a with respect to
B.
Remark 1. If ϕ is Maskin monotonic with respect to B, then ϕ is also Maskin
monotonic with respect to any superset B′ ⊇ B. In particular, if ϕ is Maskin
monotonic with respect to An , then ϕ is also Maskin monotonic with respect to
Ant and Ans .
Maskin monotonicity is introduced by Maskin (1999) in the case of B = A.
The following is a simple reinterpretation of Maskin’s basic result on implemen-
tation.
Fact 1 (Maskin, 1999). Let B ⊆ A be given. If a social choice correspon-
dence ϕ is implementable in Nash equilibrium by a game form ((Mi)i∈N , g) such
that the range of g is contained in B, then ϕ is Maskin monotonic with respect
to B.
Our first result states that Maskin monotonicity with respect to Ant together
with Pareto efficiency implies individual rationality for agents who satisfy the
richness condition.
Theorem 1. Assume F1 and F2 (transferability). Then, if a social choice
correspondence ϕ : R ³ Ant is Maskin monotonic with respect to Ant and is a
sub-correspondence of the Pareto correspondence, then for all R ∈ R and all
a ∈ ϕ(R),
ai Ri (ωi, 0) for all i ∈ Nr. (2)
Proof. We prove the following:
Claim. For all R ∈ R and all a ∈ P (R)∩Ant , if a ∈ P (R′) for all R′ that is a
Maskin monotonic transformation of R at a with respect to Ant , then a satisfies
(2).
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that (ωi, 0) Pi ai ≡ (xi, ti) holds for some














agent i, it follows that for all λ < 0, there exists a (quasi-linear) preference




(ii) for all x′i ∈ Xi \ {ωi} and all t′i ∈ R, if ai Ii (x′i, t′i), then ai Iλi (x′i, t′i).
See Figure 1. In words, the indifference set of Rλi associated with (xi, ti) is
identical to that of Ri except that the former contains (ωi, λ). It is easy to
check that Rλi is a Maskin monotonic transformation of Ri at (xi, ti) with respect
to Proj i(Ant).
67 Thus, by the hypothesis of the claim, a is Pareto efficient for
(Rλi , R−i). Now, by F1, there exists a feasible allocation a
′ = (x′j, t
′
j)j∈N such that
a′i = (ωi, 0). Let us define another allocation a
λ by





j − λ/(n− 1)) for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
F2 ensures that aλ is a feasible allocation. By P1* and P2*, all agents j 6= i
strictly prefer aλj to aj if λ < 0 is sufficiently small. Since agent i is indifferent be-
tween aλi and ai under R
λ
i , we conclude that a is not Pareto efficient for (R
λ
i , R−i)
for a sufficiently small λ, a contradiction. This proves the claim.
6To see this, let (xˆi, tˆi) ∈ L(Ri, ai)∩Proj i(Ant). If xˆi = ωi, then (ωi, 0)PiaiRi (ωi, tˆi), which
implies tˆi < 0 in violation of no-tax-for-endowments. Thus it must be the case that xˆi 6= ωi. It
then follows from (ii) that ai Rλi (xˆi, tˆi).
7It is easy to see that the converse holds as well; that is, Ri is also a Maskin monotonic
transformation of Rλi with respect to Proj i(Ant).
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The rest of the proof is straightforward. Take ϕ, R, and a ∈ ϕ(R) as in the
statement of the theorem. Then a ∈ P (R) ∩ Ant . Since ϕ is Maskin monotonic
with respect to Ant , it follows that for all R
′ that is a Maskin monotonic trans-
formation of R at a with respect to Ant , we have a ∈ ϕ(R′) and so a ∈ P (R′).
Hence the claim just proved tells us that a satisfies (2). Q.E.D.
We introduce another piece of notation. For all i ∈ N , all Ri ∈ Ri, all
ai = (xi, ti) ∈ Xi × R, and all λ ∈ R, if xi 6= ωi, then let Ti(Ri, ai, λ) denote
the set of preferences Rλi ∈ Ri that satisfy (i) and (ii) in the above proof. Note
that Ti(Ri, ai, λ) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ Nr. While λ < 0 in the above proof, we define
Ti(Ri, ai, λ) for all λ ∈ R.
Our next theorem, which is our main result, states that Maskin monotonicity
with respect to Ans together with Pareto efficiency implies that the social choice
is not blocked by any coalition that contains all agents who violate the richness
condition.
Theorem 2. Assume F3 (no negative externality). Then, if a social choice
correspondence ϕ : R³ Ans is Maskin monotonic with respect to Ans and is a sub-
correspondence of the Pareto correspondence, then for all R ∈ R, no allocation
a ∈ ϕ(R) can be improved upon by a coalition S ⊇ N \Nr.
Proof. We prove the following:
Claim. For all R ∈ R and all a ∈ P (R) ∩ Ans , if a ∈ P (R′) for all R′ that is
a Maskin monotonic transformation of R at a with respect to Ans , then a cannot
be improved upon by any S ⊇ N \Nr.
To prove the claim, denote a = (xi, ti)i∈N and let T = {i /∈ S : aiPi (ωi, 0)}. If
T = ∅, we can skip the remaining part of this paragraph and proceed to the next
paragraph. Thus we assume T 6= ∅. Since a ∈ Ans , we have xi 6= ωi for all i ∈ T .
For all i ∈ T , let R′i ∈ Ti(Ri, ai, 0). See Figure 2. In words, the indifference set
of R′i at ai is identical to that of Ri except that the former contains his initial
consumption bundle. The existence of R′i is ensured by the fact that i /∈ S implies
i ∈ Nr. It is easy to check that R′i is a Maskin monotonic transformation of Ri at
ai with respect to Proj i(Ans).
8 Thus, by the assumption of the claim, a is Pareto
efficient for (RN\T , R′T ).
8To see this, let (xˆi, tˆi) ∈ L(Ri, ai)∩Proj i(Ans). If xˆi = ωi, then no-subsidy-for-endowments
implies tˆi ≤ 0. Then by Condition (i) of Ti(Ri, ai, 0), it follows that ai R′i (xˆi, tˆi). If xˆi 6= ωi,













Now, suppose, by way of contradiction, that S can improve upon a. This
means that there exists a′S ∈ AS such that a′i Ri ai for all i ∈ S with strict
preference holding for some i ∈ S. By F3, (a′S, (ωi, 0)i∈N\S) is a feasible allocation.
Furthermore, it Pareto dominates a under (RN\T , R′T ) since agents i ∈ T are
indifferent between ai and (ωi, 0), and agents i ∈ N \ (S∪T ) weakly prefer (ωi, 0)
to ai by the definition of T . This contradiction establishes the claim.
To complete the proof, take ϕ as in the theorem and let R ∈ R and a ∈ ϕ(R).
Then a ∈ P (R) ∩ Ans . Since ϕ is Maskin monotonic with respect Ans , it follows
that for all R′ that is a Maskin monotonic transformation of R at a with respect
to Ans , a ∈ ϕ(R′) and so a ∈ P (R′). Hence, the claim just proved tells us that a
cannot be improved upon by any S ⊇ N \Nr. Q.E.D.
Setting Nr = N in Theorems 1 and 2 together with Fact 1 gives us the
following corollaries.
Corollary 1. Assume F1 and F2. Assume also that R1 holds for all agents.
Then, if a mechanism satisfies no-tax-for-endowments and implements a social
choice correspondence ϕ ⊆ P in Nash equilibrium, then ϕ ⊆ I.
Corollary 2. Assume F3. Assume also that R1 holds for all agents. Then, if
a mechanism satisfies no-subsidy-for-endowments and implements a social choice
correspondence ϕ ⊆ P in Nash equilibrium, then ϕ ⊆ C.
Remark 2. In most of the applications, C ⊆ I. However, this is not neces-
sarily the case in our general framework because we do not assume (ωi, 0) ∈ A{i}.
For example, if AS = ∅ for all S ( N , then C = P 6⊆ I.
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Corollary 2 is somewhat surprising because neither our equilibrium concept
nor our axiom suggests coalitional stability. However, it should be clear from the
proof of Theorem 2 that the key source of coalitional stability is Pareto efficiency,
which is a cooperative notion. The proof says that since allocation a is Pareto
efficient, (a′S, (ωi, 0)i∈N\S) does not Pareto dominate a, but since each i in N \ S
weakly prefers (ωi, 0) to ai, it follows that a
′
S does not dominate aS for coalition
S. What no-subsidy-for-endowments does is to derive the desired preference of
agents N \ S.
Our results apply to mechanisms in which equilibria do not exist for some
preference profiles. The reason is that for all the results above, it is immaterial
whether ϕ is nonempty-valued. Thus, what Corollary 2, for example, says is that
for any mechanism that satisfies no-subsidy-for-endowments, if the equilibrium
allocations are Pareto efficient whenever equilibria exist, then the equilibrium
allocations, when they exist, are in the core.
Given the generality of our model, the core is empty for some preference
profiles for some specifications of A and AS. For allocation problems for which
C(R) = ∅ for some R, what Corollary 2 shows is that there exists no mechanism
that satisfies no-subsidy-for-endowments and achieves Pareto efficiency for all
preference profiles. That is, to achieve Pareto efficiency for all preference profiles,
the planner has to use a mechanism that sometimes gives a positive amount to
an agent who keeps his endowments.
Remark 3. The above corollaries hold for other notions of implementation
for which Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition. An example is imple-
mentation in strong Nash equilibrium (Maskin, 1979). Another example is when a
generalized notion of mechanism is considered; e.g., Greenberg (1990) and Miya-
gawa (2001). On the other hand, our results do not extend to subgame-perfect
equilibrium; see Section 6.1.2 for a counter-example.
There are similar results in the literature. Hurwicz (1979) shows, in the
context of classical exchange economies, that if a sub-correspondence ϕ of P and
I can be implemented by a game form whose “attainable set” is convex, then ϕ
is a sub-correspondence of the Walrasian correspondence. The attainable set is
the set of consumption bundles that an agent can obtain by changing his strategy
given the others’ strategies. Hurwicz considers a game form for which this set is
convex for any agent at any strategy profile.
Hurwicz (1979) also shows that if a sub-correspondence ϕ of P and I is Maskin
monotonic in the usual sense and upper-hemi continuous, then ϕ is a super -
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correspondence of the Walrasian correspondence. A similar result is obtained by
Gevers (1986). In the context of marriage problems (without transfers), Kara
and So¨nmez (1996) show that if a sub-correspondence ϕ of P and I is Maskin
monotonic, then ϕ is a super-correspondence of C.
Remark 4. Theorems 1 and 2 do not use the full force of R1. It should be
evident from the proof that in Theorem 1, R1 can be replaced with the following
condition (stated for a particular i ∈ N):
R2. For all (xj, tj)j∈N ∈ A, all Ri ∈ Ri, and all λ < 0, if xi 6= ωi and
(ωi, 0) Pi (xi, ti), then Ti(Ri, (xi, ti), λ) 6= ∅.
For Theorem 2, it suffices to assume a variant of R2 where λ is set to zero.
Specifically, in Theorem 2, R1 can be replaced with the following condition:
R3. For all (xj, tj)j∈N ∈ A, and all Ri ∈ Ri, if xi 6= ωi and (xi, ti) Pi (ωi, 0),
then Ti(Ri, (xi, ti), 0) 6= ∅.
Remark 5. Similarly, Theorems 1 and 2 do not use the full force of Maskin
monotonicity. In Theorem 1, Maskin monotonicity with respect to Ant can be
replaced with the following condition:
M1. For all R ∈ R, all a ∈ ϕ(R) ∩Ant , all i ∈ N , all R′i ∈ Ri, and all λ < 0,
if (ωi, 0) Pi ai and R
′
i ∈ Ti(Ri, ai, λ), then a ∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i).
Similarly, in Theorem 2, Maskin monotonicity with respect to Ans can be replaced
with the following condition:
M2. For all R ∈ R, all a ∈ ϕ(R) ∩ Ans , all i ∈ N , and all R′i ∈ Ri, if
ai Pi (ωi, 0) and R
′
i ∈ Ti(Ri, ai, 0), then a ∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i).
We close this section by establishing that under weak assumptions on A and
AS, core allocations satisfy no-transfer-for-endowments and the core correspon-
dence is Maskin monotonic with respect to An .
We start with assumptions under which core allocations satisfy no-transfer-
for-endowments.
F4. For all i ∈ N , (ωi, 0) ∈ A{i}.
F5. For all a = (xi, ti)i∈N ∈ A and all k ∈ N , if xk = ωk, then
(xi, ti + tk/(n− 1))i∈N\{k} ∈ AN\{k}.
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F4 simply says that the initial bundle is feasible for each agent. F5 says that if an
agent k consumes his endowments (xk = ωk) in some feasible allocation, then the
other agents can obtain their non-monetary bundles without k’s participation.
If tk > 0, then N \ {k} can increase their aggregate amount of money by tk by
excluding k. If tk < 0, then their aggregate amount of money decreases by tk
without k’s participation.
Fact 2. If F4 (resp. F5) holds, then C(R) ⊆ Ant (resp. C(R) ⊆ Ans) for all
R ∈ R.
Proof. F4 obviously implies C(R) ⊆ I(R) ⊆ Ant . To prove the other part,
suppose F5 holds and let a ∈ A \ Ans . This means that there exists k ∈ N such
that ak = (ωk, tk) and tk > 0. By F5,
(xi, ti + tk/(n− 1))i∈N\{k}
is feasible for N \ {k} and dominates a for N \ {k}. Q.E.D.
We now give assumptions under which the core correspondence is Maskin
monotonic with respect to An . The first condition is that F5 holds not only for
A but for AS for all S ⊆ N :
F6. For all S ⊆ N , all aS = (xi, ti)i∈S ∈ AS and all k ∈ S, if xk = ωk, then
(xi, ti + tk/(|S| − 1))i∈S\{k} ∈ AS\{k}.
That is, if a feasible allocation for a coalition S is such that a member k ∈
S receives his endowments, then the other members of S can obtain the same
allocation of non-monetary goods without k’s participation.
F7. For all i ∈ N and all (xi, ti) ∈ Xi × R, if either xi 6= ωi or ti = 0, then
there exists a ∈ An such that ai = (xi, ti).
This says that any consumption bundle that satisfies no-transfer-for-endowments
is a part of some feasible allocation in which no-transfer-for-endowments is satis-
fied for all agents. F7 is equivalent to the requirement that for all i ∈ N ,
Proj i(An) = {(xi, ti) ∈ Xi × R : either xi 6= ωi or ti = 0}.
This is easily satisfied in applications. For example, consider single-object auc-
tions and take any bundle (xi, ti) for buyer i where he wins the object (thus
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xi 6= ωi). Then we can take a ∈ A where the budget is balanced between i and
the seller, i.e., t0 = −ti, and other buyers do not pay any amount.
The next condition states that for any feasible allocation for any coalition,
the total amount that the members receive is not positive.
F8. For all S ⊆ N and all (xi, ti)i∈S ∈ AS,
∑
i∈S ti ≤ 0.
This is a standard condition of budget balance.
Fact 3. If F4–F8 hold, then the core correspondence is Maskin monotonic
with respect to An .
Proof. See Appendix B.
By Maskin (1999) and Saijo (1988), Maskin monotonicity with respect to
An is almost sufficient for a correspondence to be implementable by a normal
mechanism. Precisely, we say that a social choice correspondence ϕ satisfies no
veto power with respect to An if for all R ∈ R and all a ∈ An , if [ai Ri a′i
for all a′ ∈ An ] for at least |N | − 1 agents, then a ∈ ϕ(R). This condition
is usually vacuous in applications when monetary transfers are feasible. By a
simple application of the classical result of Maskin (1999) and Saijo (1988), we
obtain that if a social choice correspondence ϕ satisfies Maskin monotonicity and
no veto power with respect to An and |N | ≥ 3, then ϕ can be implemented by a
normal mechanism in Nash equilibrium.
6 Applications
This section presents a few specific allocation problems that satisfy our assump-
tions and discusses issues associated with the examples.
6.1 Auctions
Let us return to auction problems and describe them formally using our notation.
Denote by K a non-empty finite set of objects. Then Xi = 2
K for all agents.
There is one agent (called the seller) who initially owns these objects. If we call
the seller agent 0 (thus we set N = {0, 1, . . . , n}), then w0 = K and ωi = ∅ for all
i 6= 0. For all buyers i, Ri is the set of all quasi-linear preferences. On the other
hand, the seller is a revenue-maximizer and thus |R0| = 1. Given S ⊆ N , a list
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(xi, ti)i∈S is a feasible S-allocation if and only if (xi)i∈S is a partition of ∪i∈Swi
and
∑
i∈N ti = 0. F1–F8 are then satisfied.
Since the seller is a revenue-maximizer, he does not satisfy any of the richness
conditions R1–R3. Then Nr = N \ {0} and Theorem 2 says only that the social
choice is not blocked by any coalition that contains the seller, which does not
imply individual rationality for buyers. Thus, Theorem 2 alone does not give us
the core. However, we can use Theorem 1 to establish that the social choice is
individually rational for all buyers. That is, Theorems 1 and 2 together imply
that if a mechanism satisfies no-transfer-for-endowments and implements ϕ ⊆ P
in Nash equilibrium, then ϕ ⊆ C. This example illustrates the usefulness of
Theorem 1.
6.1.1 First-Price Auctions
A mechanism that satisfies all of our requirements in this context is the first-
price mechanism, which satisfies no-transfer-for-endowments and achieves Pareto
efficiency in Nash equilibrium. To avoid a problem with ties and nonexistence of
equilibrium, consider the following variant of the first-price mechanism with an
“integer game.” Each buyer announcesmi = (bi, ki) ∈ R×{0, 1, 2, . . .}, where bi is
his bid and ki is an integer. As usual, the buyer with the highest non-negative bid
wins the object and pays the amount equal to his bid. When there are multiple
buyers with the highest non-negative bid, the winner is the one who announced
the highest integer. When there is a tie in the “integer game” as well, the winner
is the one with the smallest index among those who announced the highest bid
and integer. Formally, let N ′ = {i ∈ N \{0} : bi ≥ max{bj, 0} for all j ∈ N \{0}}
be the set of buyers who announce the highest non-negative bid. When N ′ = {i},
then i is the winner. When N ′ is not a singleton, the winner is given by
min{i ∈ N ′ : ki ≥ kj for all j ∈ N ′}.
Then it is easy to check that the mechanism has a Nash equilibrium for all
preference profiles and the equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient. Thus our
results (Theorems 1 and 2) show that the equilibrium allocations are in the core,
which is easy to check directly.
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6.1.2 Sequential First-Price Auctions
Another interesting mechanism is a sequential version of the above mechanism.
The mechanism is an extensive game form with perfect information in which
there are (|N | − 1) stages. In stage i ∈ N \ {0} of the mechanism, buyer i
announces (bi, ki) ∈ R× {0, 1, 2, . . .} knowing what buyers j < i have announced
in the previous stages. Given the announcements of the buyers, the allocation is
determined in the same way as in the simultaneous version of the mechanism.
Fact 4. Let ϕ be the correspondence that the sequential first-price mechanism
implements in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Then ϕ ⊆ P but ϕ 6⊆ C.
We first show that the subgame-perfect equilibria of the mechanism are Pareto
efficient. To see this, take any valuation profile v ∈ RN\{0} for buyers, while v0 = 0
by our assumption. Let H = {i ∈ N : vi ≥ vk for all k ∈ N} be the set of agents
with the highest valuation. Assume that the highest valuation is positive since
the other case is trivial. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that in some subgame-
perfect equilibrium, the winner is agent w /∈ H. Let h = maxH be the buyer who
moves last among H. Let v∗ = max{vi : i > h} be the highest valuation of buyers
who move after h; if h = n (so he moves in the last stage), then set v∗ = 0. Then
v∗ < vh. Thus, for a sufficiently small ε > 0, we have vh − ε > max{v∗, vw, 0}.
Since h is a loser, his utility is zero in the equilibrium. However, if he announces
bh = vh − ε, he wins the auction because vh − ε is higher than the valuation of
any buyer i who moves after h. This is a desired contradiction.
We now show that the subgame-perfect equilibria of the sequential first-price
mechanism are not necessarily core allocations. To see this, suppose that there
are two buyers (1 and 2) and their valuations are (v1, v2) = (3, 5). The following
is an equilibrium:
(b1, k1) = (0, 0),
(b2, k2) =
(b1, k1 + 1) if b1 ≤ 5,(0, 0) if b1 > 5.
That is, 2’s strategy is to match his bid with 1’s and announce a higher integer
whenever 1’s bid does not exceed 2’s valuation. When 1’s bid exceeds 2’s valua-
tion, 2 announces (0, 0). Given 2’s strategy, 1 knows that he can never win the
auction, so he announces (0, 0). This is a subgame-perfect equilibrium, but the
equilibrium outcome is that 2 wins the object without paying any amount, which
20
is not in the core.
6.2 Exchange Economies with Indivisibilities
We can generalize the above example by allowing more than one agent to have
non-empty endowments. For all i ∈ N , let ωi be the set of objects that agent i
initially owns. The set of objects in the economy is K ≡ ∪i∈Nωi and the con-
sumption space is Xi × R = 2K × R. The sets A and AS are defined as in the
previous section. Then F1–F8 are all satisfied.
An important solution concept in this context is Walrasian equilibrium. A
Walrasian equilibrium for R ∈ R is a list ((xi, ti)i∈N , (pk)k∈K) ∈ A×RK such
that for all i ∈ N ,












pk) for all Y ⊆ K.
An obvious but important observation is that the budget set contains the initial
bundle (ωi, 0). Let W (R) denote the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations
when the preference profile is R. Then it is easy to check that the correspondence
W , i.e., the Walrasian correspondence, is Maskin monotonic with respect to An .
Furthermore, W ⊆ P by the First Welfare Theorem (Bikhchandani and Mamer,
1997). Then, what Corollary 2 tells us is that W ⊆ C.
6.3 Public Goods
We have remarked that our allocation problems allow for public goods to some
extent. The following is an example.
There is a finite set K of indivisible public goods and society can choose at
most one from the set. The cost of good k ∈ K is given by c(k) ∈ R+. A
coalition S such that |S| > n/2 is entitled to choose any good in K and all
agents in the society can benefit from the good. We assume, however, that an
agent is not forced to consume the public good. That is, goods are non-rival
but refusable. For example, suppose that the public good is the speaker that an
economics department invites to its annual public seminar. The set K is the set
of candidates and c(k) is the cost of inviting speaker k. Then our assumption
simply means that one does not have to attend the seminar.
Formally, Xi = K ∪{0} where 0 means that one does not attend the seminar.
We set c(0) = 0. The initial bundle is (ωi, 0) = (0, 0). For coalitions S ⊆ N such
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that |S| > n/2, an S-allocation (xi, ti)i∈S is feasible if and only if there exists
y ∈ K ∪ {0} such that for all i ∈ S,





The first condition captures the assumption that attendance is not mandatory.
For coalitions S ⊆ N such that |S| ≤ n/2, an S-allocation (xi, ti)i∈S is feasible if
and only if xi = 0 for all i ∈ S and
∑
i∈S ti = 0. Then F1–F3 are satisfied. F3 is
satisfied simply because when a coalition S in majority determines the speaker
and pays the cost, it is feasible that other agents neither attend the seminar nor
pay a fee. In this context, no-tax-for-endowments, for example, means that a
fee is charged only to people who attend the seminar, which is not completely
realistic but reasonable.
On the other hand, this example violates F6. To see this, take any coalition
S such that |S| > n/2 and |S| − 1 ≤ n/2. This coalition is entitled to propose a
speaker even when some member k ∈ S does not attend the seminar. That is, the
coalition is effective for (xi, ti)i∈S such that xj 6= 0 for some j ∈ S while xk = 0
for some k ∈ S. However, S \ {k} is no longer entitled to propose a speaker.
Indeed, the core correspondence is not Maskin monotonic with respect to An .
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6.4 Marriage Problems
Our next example is marriage problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) where monetary
transfers are feasible. There are two finite disjoint sets M and W , where M
denotes the set of men and W denotes the set of women. For each man m ∈
M , Xm = W ∪ {m}. For each woman w ∈ W , Xw = M ∪ {w}. The initial
consumption is (ωi, 0) = (i, 0) for all i ∈ N ≡M ∪W . For each coalition S ⊆ N ,
9To see this, suppose that there are two agents (1 and 2) and two candidates (K = {α, β}),
and that inviting a speaker is costless. Preferences are quasi-linear and the valuation functions
are given by (v1(α), v1(β), v1(0)) = (3, 0, 0) and (v2(α), v2(β), v2(0)) = (0, 2, 0). Then a core
allocation is a1 = a2 = (α, 0). Now, change 1’s valuation function to (w1(α), w1(β), w1(0)) =
(0,−3, 0), which is a Maskin monotonic transformation of v1 at a1 with respect to Proj 1(An).
However, for valuation profile (w1, v2), allocation (a1, a2) is not Pareto efficient and hence not
in the core.
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an S-allocation (xi, ti)i∈S is feasible if and only if for all i ∈ S,
xi ∈ S,
xi = j if and only if xj = i,∑
i∈S
ti = 0.
Then, F1–F8 are all satisfied. When preferences are quasi-linear, the allocation
problems are equivalent to the assignment problems of Shapley and Shubik (1972).
It is easy to see that our model also covers college admissions problems (Gale and
Shapley, 1962) with monetary transfers.
6.5 Coalition Formation
Consider coalition formation problems where any coalition can form. Each agent
starts as a singleton and cares only about the coalition to which he belongs. Then
we set Xi = {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S} and ωi = {i}. For all S ⊆ N , an S-allocation
(xi, ti)i∈S is feasible if and only if
xi ⊆ S for all i ∈ S,
xi = xj or xi ∩ xj = ∅ for all i, j ∈ S,∑
i∈S
ti = 0.
The first two conditions simply say that S is partitioned. F1–F8 are then all satis-
fied. This class of problems is studied by Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia
and Jackson (2002).
On the other hand, a violation of F3 occurs if an agent cares about the entire
partition, i.e., Xi is the set of coalition structures. In this case, ωi would be the
initial coalition structure (i.e., ({1}, {2}, . . . , {n})) and so (ωi, 0) is not available
for i when a non-trivial coalition forms outside of i.
7 When Monetary Transfers Are Infeasible
Theorem 2 does not use F2, which implies that the theorem also applies to allo-
cation problems in which monetary transfers are not admissible. When transfers
are not admissible, the axiom of no-subsidy-for-endowments becomes vacuous.
Thus, the theorem tells us the relation between the core and the standard version
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of Maskin monotonicity. This section clarifies what Theorem 2 implies in this
context.
We assume that for any coalition, monetary transfers are not feasible:
F9 (No Transfers). For all S ⊆ N , all (xi, ti)i∈S ∈ AS, and all i ∈ S, ti = 0.
Under this assumption, the relevant information about preferences is the rank-
ing between bundles of the form (xi, 0). We let <Ri denote the preference relation
over Xi that is induced from Ri, i.e., for all xi, yi ∈ Xi,
xi <Ri yi ⇐⇒ (xi, 0)Ri (yi, 0).
The strict preference and indifference relations associated with <Ri are denoted
by ÂRi and ∼Ri , respectively.
Richness condition R1 in this context is equivalent to the assumption of un-
restricted domain:
R4 (Unrestricted Domain). For any complete and transitive binary re-
lation < defined over Xi, there exists Ri ∈ Ri such that <Ri is equivalent to
<.
This is stronger than necessary. The following condition suffices for our result:
R5. For all Ri ∈ Ri, and all xi ∈ Xi, there exists R′i ∈ Ri such that
yi <R′i zi ⇐⇒ yi <Ri zi for all yi, zi ∈ Xi \ {ωi},
ωi ∼R′i xi.
This says that for any xi ∈ Xi and any admissible ranking <i defined over Xi,
there exists another admissible ranking <′i that coincides with <i over Xi \ {ωi}
but such that ωi is indifferent to xi. For example, in the context of marriage
problems, R′i and Ri have the same ranking over the agents on the opposite side
of the market but differ in the set of acceptable agents.10
Theorem 2 concerns Maskin monotonicity with respect to Ans . When mone-
tary transfers are not admissible, no-subsidy-for-endowments is trivially satisfied
by any mechanism. Thus, Maskin monotonicity with respect to Ans reduces to
Maskin monotonicity with respect to A.
Furthermore, in view of Remark 5, we can weaken Maskin monotonicity. The
following condition suffices for our result.
10If xi is individually rational for Ri, then R′i is similar to what Roth and Rothblum (1999)
call a truncation of Ri.
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Definition. A social choice correspondence ϕ : R³ A satisfiesM3 if for all
R ∈ R, all (xj, 0)j∈N ∈ ϕ(R), all i ∈ N , and all R′i ∈ Ri, if
yi <Ri zi ⇐⇒ yi <R′i zi for all yi, zi ∈ Xi \ {ωi}, (3)
ωi ∼R′i xi, (4)
then (xj, 0)j∈N ∈ ϕ(R′i, R−i).
Then we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Assume F3 and F9. Assume also that R5 (or R4) holds for all
agents. Then, if a social choice correspondence ϕ ⊆ P satisfies M3 (or Maskin
monotonicity with respect to A), then ϕ ⊆ C.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2 and Remarks 4 and 5. Q.E.D.
Fact 2 remains true when transfers are not feasible since F4 and F5 do not
rely on the feasibility of transfers. On the other hand, Fact 3 does not hold
without transfers because F7 does not hold.11 In fact, the core correspondence
often violates Maskin monotonicity in important applications when preferences
<Ri are not strict since our notion of the core allows for indifference for some
members of the blocking coalition. Furthermore, the richness conditions do not
allow us to exclude indifference. The following is an example in the context of
marriage problems.
Example 1. Suppose there are two men (m1 and m2) and one woman (w1).
Their preferences are given by
m1 : w1 Â m1 w1 : m2 Â m1 Â w1,
m2 : m2 Â w1.
For this preference profile, the matching where m1 and w1 are matched is in the
core. However, this is no longer the case if m2’s preferences change to
m2 : m2 ∼ w1.
Since m2’s lower-contour set at m2 remains the same, this change is a Maskin
monotonic transformation.
11To see why F7 does not hold, note that if we take (xi, ti) such that ti 6= 0, then trivially
there exists no feasible allocation a such that ai = (xi, ti).
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This example suggests that we may want to use the weak core and weak
Pareto efficiency ruling out indifference in the dominating coalition. However,
Corollary 3 does not hold for this case since the weak Pareto correspondence
itself is Maskin monotonic with respect to A.
On the other hand, M3 is significantly easier to satisfy, as the following fact
shows.
Fact 5. If F6 and F9 hold, then the core correspondence satisfies M3.
Proof. Suppose F6 and F9 hold and let R ∈ R and a = (xj, 0)j∈N ∈ C(R).
Take any i ∈ N and any R′i ∈ Ri that satisfies (3) and (4). Take any S ⊆ N and
a′S = (x
′
j, 0)j∈S ∈ AS. We would like to show that a′S does not dominate a for
coalition S when the preference profile is (R′i, R−i). This is trivial if i /∈ S, so we
assume i ∈ S. We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: Suppose ωi /∈ {xi, x′i}. Then by (3), (x′i <R′i xi ⇐⇒ x′i <Ri xi) and
(x′i ÂR′i xi ⇐⇒ x′i ÂRi xi). Then, since a′S does not dominate a for S under R,
the domination does not hold under (R′i, R−i) either.
Case 2: Suppose ωi = xi. Then R
′
i and Ri are identical, so the desired result
follows.
Case 3: Suppose ωi = x
′
i. Then (4) implies
xi ∼R′i x′i. (5)
Furthermore, since x′i = ωi, F6 implies
a′S\{i} ∈ AS\{i}.
This together with a ∈ C(R) implies that a′S\{i} does not dominate a for S \ {i}.




A downside of implementation theory is that it relies heavily on mechanisms
that are enormously complex and unrealistic. Given that not all mechanisms are
reasonable, it makes sense to identify important properties of mechanisms and
characterize implementability when these properties are required.12 Our result
12Studies along this line include Jackson (1992), Dutta et al. (1995), Saijo et al. (1996), and
Sjo¨stro¨m (1996).
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shows that a practical but seemingly trivial restriction on admissible mechanisms
can significantly reduce the class of implementable correspondences.
Another insight that our result gives us is the importance of the core. The im-
portance of the core is not clear from its definition when noncooperative behavior
is dominant among agents. Furthermore, the core has been criticized and alter-
native cooperative solution concepts have been proposed. However, our result
suggests that the core is relevant even when agents’ behavior is noncooperative
and regardless of the deficiencies in the definition of the core.
One of the most useful corollaries of our results is that for allocation problems
for which the core is empty for some preference profiles, Pareto efficiency can be
achieved in Nash equilibrium only by a mechanism that sometimes pays agents
who keep their endowments.
An important weakness of this paper is the assumption of richness. It limits
the application of our results considerably, although there exist a number of
allocation problems for which our results apply. Another weakness is the use of
Nash equilibrium with complete information, which also limits the importance of
our results for certain applications.
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A Appendix: Strategy-Proofness
This section shows that similar results hold when we replace Maskin monotonic-
ity with strategy-proofness and non-bossiness. These results are less significant
because strategy-proofness and non-bossiness are rather demanding and would be
incompatible with efficiency in many of the interesting applications of our model
(Green and Laffont, 1979; Holmstro¨m, 1979). However, we find it instructive to
prove parallel results for strategy-proofness.
A single-valued social choice correspondence ϕ : R → A is called a social
choice function . We denote by ϕi(R) the consumption bundle assigned to
agent i when the preference profile is R. A social choice function ϕ is strategy-
proof if for all R ∈ R, all i ∈ N , and all R′i ∈ Ri, ϕi(R)Ri ϕi(R′i, R−i).
We modify the richness conditions slightly. As before, the following condition
is stated for a given agent i ∈ N :
R6. For all a = (xj, tj)j∈N ∈ A, all Ri ∈ Ri, and all λ ∈ R, if xi 6= ωi, then




(ii) for all x′i ∈ Xi \ {xi, ωi} and all t′i ∈ R, if ai Ri (x′i, t′i), then ai P ′i (x′i, t′i).
This condition differs from R2 and R3 in two respects. First, λ is nonnegative in
the previous conditions while the restriction is not imposed in R6. Second, in (ii),




i) and ai in the previous conditions
while R6 requires that ai should be strictly preferred for R
′
i. We let N
′
r ⊆ N
denote the set of agents for whom R6 is satisfied. Let T ′i (Ri, ai, λ) denote the set
of preferences R′i ∈ Ri that satisfy (i) and (ii) in the definition of R6.
Proposition 1. Assume F1 and F2. Assume also that for all i ∈ N , Ri
contains only quasi-linear preferences and Xi is finite. Then, if a social choice
function ϕ : R → Ant is strategy-proof and is a selection13 from P , then for all
R ∈ R and all i ∈ N ′r, ϕi(R)Ri (ωi, 0).
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that (ωi, 0) Pi ϕi(R) ≡ (xi, ti) for
some i ∈ N ′r. Since ϕ(R) ∈ Ant , xi 6= ωi. For a given λ < 0, let Rλi ∈





This together with no-tax-for-endowments implies ϕi(R
λ
i , R−i) = (xi, ti). By F1,
13A social choice function ϕ is a selection from a social choice correspondence F if ϕ(R) ∈
F (R) for all R ∈ R.
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there exists a feasible allocation a∗ = (x∗i , t
∗




i ) = (ωi, 0). Since
ϕ is a selection from P , (xλj , t
λ
j )j∈N ≡ ϕ(Rλi , R−i) is Pareto efficient for (Rλi , R−i).


















where vj denote the valuation function of agent j 6= i and vλi denote agent i’s
valuation function associated with Rλi . However, the inequality does not hold for
all λ < 0 since vλi (xi)− vλi (ωi) = λ− ti. Q.E.D.
This result corresponds to Theorem 1. A parallel result that corresponds to
Theorem 2 does not hold, even with the assumption of quasi-linear preferences. A
counter-example is the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism, which does not neces-
sarily produce a core allocation in auctions with multiple objects (Bikhchandani
and Ostroy, 1999).
However, we can obtain a counterpart of Theorem 2 if we strengthen strategy-
proofness by adding non-bossiness. This is not very surprising given the well-
known similarity between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness with non-
bossiness. However, it may be worth knowing that a parallel result does hold. It
is not the case that one result follows from the other.
We first give the definition of non-bossiness.
Definition. A social choice function ϕ is non-bossy if for all R ∈ R, all
i ∈ N , and all R′i ∈ Ri, if ϕi(R′i, R−i) = ϕi(R), then ϕj(R′i, R−i) Ij ϕj(R) for all
j ∈ N .
In words, non-bossiness says that no one can affect other agents’ welfare with-
out changing his consumption. To understand the meaning, suppose that it is
violated, i.e., ϕi(R
′
i, R−i) = ϕi(R) and not ϕj(R
′
i, R−i) Ij ϕj(R) for some j 6= i.
Then agent i can affect agent j’s welfare with no cost to himself. This suggests a
possibility of collusion where agent i reports a preference relation that is favorable
for agent j in exchange for a transfer from agent j.14
14Non-bossiness has several versions. A version used often in the literature is that no one can
change other agents’ consumption without changing his own consumption. Another reasonable
version is that no one can change other agents’ welfare without changing his own welfare. These
versions are stronger than the one we use.
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Proposition 2. Assume F1 and F2. If a social choice function ϕ : R→ Ant
is strategy-proof, non-bossy, and is a selection from P , then
ϕi(R)Ri (ωi, 0) for all i ∈ N ′r and all R ∈ R.
Proof. Suppose that (ωi, 0) Pi ϕi(R) ≡ (xi, ti) for some i ∈ N ′r. For any
λ < 0, let Rλi ∈ T ′i (Ri, (xi, ti), λ) as in the proof of Proposition 1. Then as before,
strategy-proofness implies ϕi(R
λ
i , R−i) = (xi, ti). Non-bossiness then implies that
for all j 6= i, ϕj(Rλi , R−i)Ijϕj(R). By the argument in the proof of Theorem 2, we
can show that for small λ, there exists a feasible allocation aλ that Pareto domi-
nates ϕ(R) under (Rλi , R−i). Since ϕ(R
λ
i , R−i) is Pareto indifferent to ϕ(R) under
(Rλi , R−i), the Pareto domination is in contradiction with ϕ being a selection from
the Pareto correspondence. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3. Assume F2 and F3. Then, if a social choice function ϕ : R→
Ans is strategy-proof, non-bossy, and is a selection from P , then there exists no
R ∈ R and no coalition S ⊇ N \N ′r such that S improves upon ϕ(R) under R.
Proof. Suppose that there exist R ∈ R and S ⊇ N \ N ′r such that S can
improve upon ϕ(R) under R ∈ R. This means that there exists a feasible S-




i)i∈S such that a
′
iRiϕi(R) for all i ∈ S with strict preference
holding for some m ∈ S. P1* and P2* imply that for a sufficiently small ε ≥ 0,
we have (x′m, t
′
m − ε) Pm ϕm(R).
Let K = {i ∈ N \ S : ϕi(R) Pi (ωi, 0)}. If this set is empty, we can proceed
directly to the last paragraph of the proof. So, we assume K 6= ∅. Without loss
of generality, we rename the agents so that K = {1, 2, . . . , k}. Let λ > 0 be a
small number such that ϕi(R) Pi (ωi, λ) for all i ∈ K.
We now define a list of preference profiles (R`)k`=0 recursively. Let R
0 =
R. Having defined R0, . . . , R`−1, let R′` ∈ T ′`(R`−1` , ϕ`(R`−l), λ) and then R` =
(R′`, R
`−1
−` ). Note that agent ` satisfies R6 since ` /∈ S implies ` ∈ N ′r. For R′` to
be well defined, it has to be the case that he does not get ω` in ϕ`(R
`−1), which
we will see shortly.
Claim. For all ` ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} and all i ∈ N ,
ϕi(R
`) I ′i (ωi, λ) if i ≤ `,
ϕi(R
`) Ii ϕi(R) if i > `.
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We prove the claim by induction on `. The case of ` = 0 is trivial since
R0 = R. So suppose that the claim is proved for some ` < k. Since the claim
holds for `, we have ϕ`+1(R
`) I`+1 ϕ`+1(R) P`+1 (ω`+1, λ) where the last relation
comes from `+ 1 ∈ K. This together with ϕ : R → Ans implies that agent `+ 1
does not obtain ω`+1 in allocation ϕ(R
`). This ensures that R′`+1 is well defined.







`) for all i ∈ N. (7)
We now check that the claim holds for `+1. For agents i ≤ `, we have R`+1i = R′i.
Thus (7) together with the induction hypothesis implies ϕi(R
`+1)I ′iϕi(R
`)I ′i(ωi, λ).
For agents i > ` + 1, we have R`+1i = Ri, and thus ϕi(R
`+1) Ii ϕi(R
`) Ii ϕi(R).
For agent `, (6) and the construction of R′`+1 imply ϕ`+1(R
`+1) = ϕ`+1(R
`) I ′`+1
(ω`+1, λ). This proves the claim.





m − ε) if i = m
(x′i, t
′
i) if i ∈ S \ {m}
(ωi, λ) if i ∈ K
(ωi, 0) if i /∈ S ∪K.
Since ε and λ can be arbitrarily small, we choose them so that ε = |K|λ; if K = ∅,
then we set ε = 0. By F2 and F3, a∗ is a feasible allocation. However, a∗ Pareto
dominates ϕ(Rk) under Rk, which gives us a desired contradiction. To see the
Pareto domination, note first that for agents in K, the claim just proved for ` = k
implies that they are indifferent between (ωi, λ) and ϕi(R
k). For the other agents,
the claim implies that they are indifferent between ϕ(Rk) and ϕ(R). Moreover,
(x′i, t
′
i)i∈S dominates ϕ(R) for coalition S, and the definition of K implies that
the agents outside of S ∪K weakly prefer (ωi, 0) to ϕi(R). Finally, the choice of
m ∈ S and ε ≥ 0 ensures that the preference is strict for agent m. Q.E.D.
Corollary 4. Assume F1 and F2. Assume also that R6 is satisfied for all
agents. Then, if a social choice function ϕ : R→ Ant is strategy-proof, non-bossy,
and is a selection from P , then ϕ is a selection from I.
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Corollary 5. Assume F2 and F3. Assume also that R6 is satisfied for all
agents. Then, if a social choice function ϕ : R→ Ans is strategy-proof, non-bossy,
and is a selection from P , then ϕ is a selection from C.
The last corollary resembles the result of So¨nmez (1999), who shows, for a
general class of allocation problems in which monetary transfers are not feasible,
that if a social choice function ϕ is strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individ-
ually rational, then ϕ is a selection from C. There are at least two differences
between his result and ours. First, So¨nmez uses individual rationality while we
use non-bossiness. Second, So¨nmez assumes that transfers are not feasible, while
we assume that transfers are feasible. Our result and So¨nmez’s both show that
there exists a strong and robust link between strategy-proofness and the core.
B Appendix: Proof of Fact 3
Let R ∈ R and a ∈ C(R)∩An . By F4, a ∈ I(R). Let R′ be a Maskin monotonic
transformation of R at a with respect to An . Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that a /∈ C(R′), so there exist S ⊆ N and a′S ∈ AS such that a′i ≡ (x′i, t′i)R′i ai for
all i ∈ S with strict preference holding for some i ∈ S. Let
T = {i ∈ S : x′i = ωi},
which may be empty. By F7, (ωi, 0) ∈ Proj i(An) for all i ∈ N . Since R′i is a
Maskin monotonic transformation of Ri at ai with respect to Proj i(An), it follows



















which is in violation of F8.
Now, F6 implies
(a′′i )i∈S\T ≡ (x′i, t′i +
∑
j∈T
t′j/|S \ T |)i∈S\T ∈ AS\T .
We show that this allocation dominates a for coalition S \ T under R, which
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gives a desired contradiction. So, take any i ∈ S \ T . Let t∗i ∈ R be such that
(x′i, t
∗
i ) Ii ai. Since x
′
i 6= ωi, F7 implies (x′i, t∗i ) ∈ Proj i(An). Since R′i is a Maskin

















i ) Ii ai, (9)
which holds for all i ∈ S \ T .
It remains to show that there exists at least one i ∈ S \ T such that a′′i Pi ai.
We know that there exists k ∈ S such that a′k P ′k ak. If k /∈ T , then the first
preference in (8) holds strictly for k, so the second preference in (9) holds strictly
for him. If k ∈ T , then t′k > 0, so the first preference in (9) holds strictly for all
i ∈ S \ T . Q.E.D.
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